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Abstract
This work explores dynamics existing in interactions between players. The dynamic
system of games is a new attitude to modeling in which an event is modeled using
several games. The model allows us to analyze the interplay capabilities and the
feasibility objectives of each player after a conflict with other players objectives and
capabilities. As an application we model relations between Soviet Union and America
after World War II to October 1962, by using the dynamic system of games. The
dynamic system of games as an important insight clearly has significant implications
for modeling strategic interactions in which player pursue goals for increasing their
personal interests. In addition, we introduce a new game in which there is a dilemma
which this dilemma occurs in most societies. We investigate depends on the claim
that each player in this dilemma is hyper-rational. In concept of hyper-rational, the
player thinks about profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or
loss and then will choose an action which is desirable to him. In this dilemma, a weak
trust has been created between players, but it is fragile.
Keywords
Game theory; 1962 Cuban missile crisis; Strategic interactions; Rationality
1 Introduction
Game theory provide the theoretical underpinnings of analytical techniques
and their application in social research. Indeed more fields of science have
benefited from game theoretic models. Dynamic games provide a framework for
modeling the behavior of players in situations where there are dynamic strategic
interactions. Long provides a survey of models of dynamic games in industrial
organization [12]. At the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, write: We
repeat most emphatically that our theory is thoroughly static. A dynamic theory
1Department of Mathematics, Semnan University P.O. Box 35195-363, Semnan, Iran
2Department of Civil Engineering, Semnan University P.O. Box 35195-363, Semnan, Iran
Email: g.askari@semnan.ac.ir; meshaghi@semnan.ac.ir; alizarei@semnan.ac.ir
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
02
89
4v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  7
 Fe
b 2
01
8
2 ()
would unquestionably be more complete and therefore preferable [13]. Eshaghi
and Askari, recently introduced a new method of modeling in game theory, named
the dynamic system of strategic games [4]. In this modeling, new properties of
games such as game-maker game, strategy-maker game and the pair of rational
actions are presented and with the help of these properties, the dynamics of
players behavior are studied. According to this feature, strategic games were
divided into two classes, strategy maker games, and games that aren’t strategy
maker. Also, Strategy maker games itself are of two groups and games that aren’t
strategy maker itself are two groups. Here we present required concepts and terms,
some advantages of this modeling and prove two propositions. Exactly similar to
everyday life or the process of negotiations, in the dynamic system of games after
the choice of strategy or rational action pairs by the players, by entering into the
new games the productive game is out of reach. Therefore, the producer games are
out of reach of the players and only as a history of the system that can influence
the selection of strategies and games in the future.
As an application of the dynamic system of strategic games, we seek modeling
of conflict between Soviet Union and America after World War II to October
28, 1962. The Cold War was a state of geopolitical tension after World War II
between powers in the Eastern Bloc and powers in the Western Bloc. Prior to
1957, Cuba had for many years been under the complete economic and political
control of the United States. In late 1956 a revolution to overthrow the Batista
regime was initiated by Fidel Castro, and in 1959 he managed to take control
of Cuba. The situation was made more unstable by the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs
and a declaration by the Soviet Union of its willingness to aid Cuba in defending
itself against the US [7]. Countries Soviet Union and America also belong to
different models of international relation and political systems. For modeling of
Cuban missile crisis, we divide the period into 5 parts and in each period we
examine static games with perfect information which had occurred. In return
for a public US pledge not to invade Cuba and a private assurance that the US
controlled missiles in Turkey would eventually be dismantled, the Soviets agreed
to withdraw the missiles [16].
Theory of Game have introduced the variety of games to express the
circumstances of the event [2]. The game theorists present the variety of models
for interpreting the interaction conditions that players face, which they suggest
solutions to resolve these conflicts( see [15, 11]). In the following, we introduced
Rostam’s Dilemma. Rostam’s Dilemma is a symmetric 2× 2 game that examines
difficult conditions of decision making between players. Difference between
this dilemma and some of other dilemmas is that in the Rostam’s Dilemma,
cooperation is weak dominant over non-cooperation. As an application of this
Dilemma, social dilemma in the way of a wife and husband is modeled.
32 Dynamic system of games
Maybe an event can’t be modeled completely through one game but there is
more chance with several games [4]. The dynamic system of strategic games is a
dynamic model of 2× 2 games. The advantages of this modeling include:
• Considering the impact of games on each other
• Using several games to model an event
• Dynamic interaction between players
• Performance of players’ rationality within the system
• Selecting an agreed mechanism between players to achieve cooperation
• Finding solutions to conflicts
In dynamics of the decision-making process in traditional game theory by
modeling the game in its extensive form, in each node one player was able to
make a decision, but in dynamic system of games in each node, two or more
players are able to make decisions. The inability to model the dynamical element
of game play in static game theory, and the extent to which dynamic system
of games naturally incorporates dynamical considerations, reveals an important
virtue of dynamic system of games.
Here, we consider strategic 2× 2 games with perfect information. If a game
produces other games, it is called game-maker game. In general, if the games
g1, g2, ..., gn generate games g
′
1, g
′
2, ..., g
′
m, then gi- and g
′
i-s are called producer
and produced, respectively. We call the form of displaying game-maker games as
dynamic system of strategic games.
If a game create one or more strategies is will be called strategy-maker game.
Each strategy has at least two pairs of actions. Each pair of actions includes
players’ payoffs. The produced strategies can be dominant strategy, dominated
strategy, weakly dominant strategy and weakly dominated strategy. Therefore,
each dominant action of a player can be called dominant strategy of a player. If a
game doesn’t generate any strategy, the game isn’t strategy maker.
In a strategic game with ordinal preferences, player is action a
′′
i strictly
dominates her action a
′
i if
ui(a
′′
i , a−i) > ui(a
′
i, a−i) for every a−i ∈ A−i,
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences [14]. If for player
i the action a
′′
i is preferred to action a
′
i per every choice of action of other players,
it is called strictly dominant strategy and is shown by Sji where kS
j
i shows j-th
strategy of i-th player from k-th game.
In a strategic game with ordinal preferences, player is action a
′′
i weakly
dominates her action a
′
i if
ui(a
′′
i , a−i) ≥ ui(a
′
i, a−i) for every a−i ∈ A−i
and
ui(a
′′
i , a−i) > ui(a
′
i, a−i) for some a−i ∈ A−i,
4 ()
g1
1C 1D
1C 4,4 1,3
1D 3,1 2,2
Figure 1. The Stag Hunt game g1 is a strategy maker game of order (2, 0). Each player
has two action kC or action kD where k-th shows number of game.
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences [14]. If for player
i the action a
′′
i is preferred over action a
′
i for each action choice of other players,
it is called weakly dominant strategy and will be represented by Sji .
If a game with n players is strategy maker for k players (1 ≤ k ≤ n) it is called
strategy maker game of order (n, k). If a game with n players isn’t strategy maker
it is called strategy maker game of order (n, 0). In other word, we can consider
a strategy maker game of order (n, 0) as a game which is not strategy maker. In
the following, we introduce pair of rational actions. Players preferences on pairs
of rational actions are based on payoffs that they obtain.
Definition 1. (Pair of rational actions) A pair of actions is called rational if at
least hold true in one of the following conditions:
• would be Nash equilibrium;
• pair of actions, would be Pareto dominant for both players over other pairs
of actions;
• for each game that is strategy maker of order (2, 1), pairs of rational actions
for one player is responses to dominant strategy or weakly dominant strategy
produced for other player.
In a strategy maker game of order (2, 2) where both players have strictly
dominant strategy and the game hasn’t Pareto action pairs over Nash equilibrium,
the Nash equilibrium of game is the only rational actions pair. In Fig.1, Stag
Hunt game g1 is strategy maker of order (2, 0). This game has Nash equilibriums
(1C, 1C) and (1D, 1D). Also in this game, (1C, 1C) is the dominant Pareto
compared to pair of action (1D, 1D). Therefore, set of rational actions pair of
players includes (1C, 1C) and (1D, 1D).
A tools that can display dynamic system of strategic games is games graph.
Within each node of a graph, there is a strategic game in which players can make
decisions. Each node of this graph can be generator of the next game through the
two following methods and be connected to it:
1. strategies
2. pair of rational actions
Moving to the next node by the made strategy is always preference of one of
players but continuing game with rational action pair may be preference of one
5player or both of them. Graph nodes are considered as initial node, move node and
final node. Nodes that players desire to continue the game are called move node.
Final node is a node that players have no desire to continue the games (system).
Every dynamic system of games includes players set, strategies set, set of rational
actions pairs, system history and node and systemic preferences of players.
A graph G is given by (G,E), where G = {g1, g2, ..., gn} is a finite set of
nodes or vertices that each node of this graph is a strategic game and E =
{gigj , gsgr, ..., gkgl} is a set of pairs of vertices (or 2-subsets of E) called branches
or edges which indicates which nodes are produced strategies or pair of rational
actions. Set of all strategies produced by k-th game is represented by kS =
kS1 ∪ kS2 ∪ ∅. Set of all pairs of actions players’ in k-th game is shown with
kA = kA1 × kA2. Set of all pairs of rational actions for player i is shown with kA′i
that is a subset of kA, for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Let A = 1A ∪ 2A ∪ ... ∪ nA ∪ ∅ and S = 1S ∪ 2S ∪ ... ∪ nS be two set. The set
valued functions, rational actions pair φ
′
i : G→ A and strategy maker φi : G→ S
for players i’s are defined as follows:
φ
′
i(gk) = kA
′
i =

{(kai, ka−i)i|(kai, ka−i)i ∈ kA if gk has pair of
rational actions
∅ if gk has′nt pair of
rational actions,
φi(gk) = kSi =
{ {kSji |kSji ∈ kS} if gk is strategy maker for player i
∅ if gk is′nt strategy maker for player i,
for all i ∈ N and j, k ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}, where gk shows k-th game, (kai, ka−i)i
shows rational actions pair of i-th player from k-th game and kS
j
i shows j-th
strategy of i-th player from k-th game. Every move of system as a member of set
M is as follows:
M :=
{
mjk| mjk = kSji or mjk = (kai, ka−i)i or
mjk = (kai, ka−i)i,j ∀ kSji ∈ kSi,
(kai, ka−i)i ∈ kAi, (kai, ka−i)j ∈ kAj
}
,
where mjk shows j-th move of k-th game and (kai, ka−i)i,j shows the pair of
rational action selected by players i and j of k-th game. Players move function
ϕi : M → G2 and ϕi,j : M → G2 ∪ ∅ with ϕi,j(kSji ) = ∅ is defined as following:
ϕi(m
j
k) =
{
(gk, gp) = gkgp if m
j
k = kS
j
i
(gk, gq) = gkgq if m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i,
ϕi,j(m
j
k) =
{ ∅ if mjk = kSji
(gk, gs) = gkgs if m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i,j .
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The above function shows by what move two game nodes have been connected
to each other by one or both players. Consequently, it can be said that in move
mjk = kS
j
i , nodes gk and gp have been connected through the strategy selected by
player i to each other. In move mjk = (kai, ka−i)i the nodes gk and gq have been
connected by pair of rational action selected by player i to each other. In move
mjk = (kai, ka−i)i,j the nodes gk and gs have been connected through a pair of
rational actions selected by players i and j to each other.
Consider that H is a set including all series (finite and infinite) that hold true
in the following conditions:
1. ∅ is member of H.
2. Sequence
{
mji , {gk,mjk}
}
i,j,k∈I for all i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, is a member of
H. Each member of H is called a history and is represented by h.
3. History h =
{
mji , {gk,mjk}
}
i,j,k∈I is called final history if it is infinite or
there isn’t gk+1 that is a member of h.
The set H is called system history. Preferences of each node of a games system
that are exactly the same preferences on the pairs of a strategic game actions
are called node preferences or tactical preferences. Preferences on strategies set or
set of rational actions pair of a game is called systemic preferences or strategic
preferences.
Definition 2. (Dynamic system of strategic games) A dynamic system of
strategic games with perfect information including:
• a set of players
• for each player, a set of strategies
• for each player, a set of rational actions pair
• system history
• node preferences (tactical preferences) on set of all actions pairs
• systemic preferences (strategic preferences) on strategies or pairs of rational
actions.
This modeling allows players to design games to earn most benefit during the
negotiation and based on their bargaining power. In the produced games, players
and strategies may change depending on conditions and also players and strategies
may increase or decrease. This system will be provided practical freedom in which
players can analyze their interaction conditions with others in the future and
decide what strategy they choose and at what level has interaction. Also, a player
may choose an action that has less outcome for him, in game conditions, but,
obtain more benefit in future according to strategic preferences and conversely
may he prefer present over future or a player may prefer tactical preferences
on strategic preferences. From this modeling, the following propositions can be
deduced.
Proposition 3. Each strategy-maker game G, has at least one pair of rational
actions.
7Proof. Suppose G is a strategy-maker game. Then game G, either is strategy-
maker game of order (2, 1) or is strategy-maker game of order (2, 2). If game G, is
strategy-maker game of order (2, 1), then pairs of rational actions for one player
is responses to strictly dominant strategy or weakly dominant strategy produced
for other player. If game G, is strategy-maker game of order (2, 2), both players
either have strictly dominant strategy and game hasn’t Pareto action pairs over
Nash equilibrium, then the Nash equilibrium of game is the only rational actions
pair or have weakly dominant strategy, then in this case game has more than one
rational actions pair.
Contrary to the above proposition, do not be right. That is, there are games
that has pair of rational actions, but are not necessarily a strategy-maker.
Proposition 4. Each game G that does not have a pair of rational actions is
not strategy-maker.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. First suppose G is a strategy-maker game.
Then by proposition 3, game G has at least one pair of rational actions, which is
inconsistent with main assumption of proposition 4.
Contrary to the above proposition, do not be right. That is, there are games
that are not strategy-maker, but has a pair of rational actions. In the following, we
propose a different model from coincident attendance Soviet Union and America
in Cuban Missile Crisis.
3 Cuban Missile Crisis
Soviet Union and America relations after World War II sometimes was strained.
But the most important and dangerous crisis in Soviet Union and America
relations, that put the world in the edge of a destructive war, was on establishment
of Soviet Missile bases in Cuba. Soviet Union wanted to establish a massive arsenal
in this region of Cuba in which deploy great number of heavy weapons to become
the largest military station of this country in Caribbean. But Khrushchevs trick
was ultimately revealed. In October 1962 an American spy plane discovered the
site of missile launch in the west of Havana that confirmed establishment of
medium-range missiles in Cuba. To confront with danger that threat America’s
security, America’s then president also constituted a war council and for one
week, a serious and secret discussion was helpful in White House. In this Council,
different suggestions including an all-out military attack to Cuba and military
occupation of the country or bombarding missile launch platform in Cuba were
announced. In continuance, Kenedi, in 22 October 1962 warned American people
that Soviet government has established missile bases in Cuba and deploy of these
missiles in a distance of one hundred mile from America beaches is a threat for the
country’s security. Kennedy at the same time with this warning announced that
Soviet government must remove its missile bases from Cuba. Following this, he
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issued the order of Cuba naval blocked to prevent transfer of Soviet’s new missile
equipments to Cuba [8]. This issue became a world crisis for one week.
Now, using dynamic system of games, we model relations between Soviet Union
and America after World War II to October 28, 1962. To this end, we divide the
period into 5 parts and in each period we examine static games with perfect
information which had occur. The first period is after World War II to October
13, 1962 that is shown in the form of game g1. Second period from October 14
to 22 includes games g2 and g3. Third period is from October 23 to 25 that
includes games g4, g5, g6 and g7. Fourth period is from October 26 to 27 that
includes games g8 and g9. And finally, the day October 28 that includes game
g10. For more information about Cuban Missile Crisis, refer to references (see
[1, 3, 9, 10]).
Relations of Soviet Union and America after World War II and during 1950s
were entered in Deadlock game and they hadn’t much desire to cooperation with
each other. As a result, both countries had selected non-cooperation. Deadlock
game g1 has been shown in Fig. 2. Soviets is assumed as row player (player 1) and
America is assumed column player (player 2). The players’ set of actions include
cooperation 1C and defect 1D. Players’ preferences in this node are the same
order preferences of strategic game g1. The game Nash equilibrium is (1D, 1D).
In g1, dominant strategy 1S
1
1 is defect and dominated strategy 1S
2
1 is cooperation
for player 1. Also this game is producer of dominant strategy of defect 1S
1
2 and
dominated strategy of cooperation 1S
2
2 for player 2. In other words, game g1 is
strategy maker of order (2, 2). The only pair of rational actions for players is
(1D, 1D)1,2. Based on players being rational, they select dominant strategy 1S
1
1
and dominant strategy 1S
1
2 for the game continuation. According to its dominant
strategy, Soviet, was convinced in July 1962 to implement its Atomic Missile
Establishment plan in Cuba that in order to confront with America’s growing
expansion. This strategy caused Soviet to hostage a part of Havana in Cuba
(America’s backyard). But Khrushchevs trick was ultimately revealed. In October
1962 an American spy plane discovered the missile launch sit in the west of Havana
that confirmed establishment of medium-range missiles in Cuba.
Strategy 1S
1
1 ends to Hostage game g2. Soviet wanted to surprise Americans.
In this game, Soviet has two actions: either cooperates 2C through removing
missile or defect 2D and maintain missiles. America could reveal the issue 2C or
keep it secret 2D. The game Nash equilibrium is (2D, 2C). This game is producer
of dominant strategy of defect 2S
1
1 and dominated strategy of cooperation 2S
2
1
for player 1 and also dominant strategy 2S
1
2 for player 2 is reveal the issue and
dominated strategy 2S
2
2 is keep it secret. The only pair of rational actions for both
players is (2D, 2C)1,2.
Strategy 1S
1
2 ends to Self-Serving game g3. In g3, America has two actions:
either it does nothing and makes cooperation 3C or makes defect 3D through
blockade of Cuba. Also, Soviet also has two actions: either it cooperates 3C to
remove missile through diplomatic canal or makes defect 3D and maintain missiles.
The game Nash equilibrium is (3C, 3D). g3 is strategy maker of order (2, 1). This
9game is producer of dominant strategy of defect 3S
1
2 and dominated strategy of
cooperation 3S
2
2 for player 2. Pairs of rational actions for players are (3C, 3D)1,2
and (3D, 3D)1.
Strategy 2S
1
1 ends to Chicken g4. In g4, Soviet has two actions: either doesn’t
attack to America 4C or attack to America 4D. Also, America has two actions:
either it doesn’t attack to Soviet 4C or attacks to Soviet for retaliation 4D. The
game Nash equilibria are (4C, 4D) and (4D, 4C). g4 is strategy maker of order
(2, 0). In other words, this game isn’t strategy maker for players. The players’
pairs of rational actions are (4C, 4C)1,2, (4D, 4C)1 and (4C, 4D)2.
Strategy 2S
1
2 ends to Stag Hunt g5. In g5, America has two actions: either
through diplomacy seeks solution 5C or through diplomacy put pressure on Soviet
5D. Also, Soviet has two actions: either it seeks solution 5C through diplomacy
or thinks about crisis intensification 5D. The game Nash equilibria are (5C, 5C)
and (5D, 5D). g5 is strategy maker of order (2, 0). The players’ pair of rational
actions are (5C, 5C)1,2 and (5D, 5D)1,2.
Pair of rational actions (3C, 3D)1 ends to another Stag Hunt g6. In g6, Soviet has
two actions: either it doesn’t break blockade 6C or break the blockade 6D. Also,
America has two actions: either it doesn’t conflict 6C with Soviet ships or conflict
with Soviet ships 6D. The game Nash equilibria are (6C, 6C) and (6D, 6D). g6 is
strategy maker of order (2, 0). The players’ pair of rational actions are (6C, 6C)1,2
and (6D, 6D)1,2.
Strategy 3S
1
2 ends to Chicken g7. In g7, America has two actions: either doesn’t
attack to Soviet 7C or attack to Soviet 7D . Also, Soviet has two actions: either
it doesn’t attack to America 7C or attacks to America in a retaliatory invasion
7D. The game Nash equilibria are (7C, 7D) and (7D, 7C). g7 is strategy maker of
order (2, 0). The players’ pairs of rational actions are (7C, 7C)1,2, (7D, 7C)1 and
(7C, 7D)2.
Based rationality of players and strategic preferences, players selecting pairs of
rational actions (4C, 4C)1,2, (5C, 5C)
′
1,2 and (6C, 6C)1,2 end to Coordination game
g8. In g8, Soviet has two actions: either it issues the command of ships not to move
toward Cuba 8C or thinks about resolving the crisis through negotiation 8D. Also,
America has two actions: either it issues the command that America’s ships not
confront with Soviet 8C or thinks about resolving the crisis through negotiation
8D. The game Nash equilibria are (8C, 8C) and (8D, 8D). g8 is strategy maker of
order (2, 0). The players’ pairs of rational actions are (8C, 8C)1,2 and (8D, 8D)1,2.
Based on players’ rationality and strategic preferences, players by selection of
rational actions pairs (5C, 5C)1,2, (6C, 6C)
′
1,2 and (7C, 7C)1,2 ends to Rostam’s
Dilemma g9. In g9, Soviet has two actions: either it removes missile from Cuba
9C or maintains missiles in Cuba 9D. Also, America has two actions: either it
removes blockade of Cuba 9C or maintains blockade of Cuba 9D. The game
Nash equilibria are (9C, 9C) and (9D, 9D). g9 is strategy maker of order (2, 2).
In g9, the weak dominant strategy 9S
1
1 for Soviet is removing missiles and its
weakly dominated strategy 9S
2
1 is maintaining missiles. Also, for America weakly
dominant strategy 9S
1
2 is removing blockade and weakly dominated strategy 9S
2
2
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is maintaining blockade. The players’ pairs of rational actions are (9C, 9C)1,2,
(9D, 9D)1,2, (9D, 9C)1 and (9C, 9D)2.
Based on players rationality and strategic preferences, players by selection of
pairs of rational actions (8C, 8C)1,2 and (9C, 9C)1,2 ends to game Win-Win g10. In
this game, both players have two actions cooperation 10C and defection 10D. The
game Nash equilibrium is (10C, 10C). In this step, the players have no appetence
to continue so this completed the system. Dynamic system of game with strategic
games between Soviet and America is represented by graphs in Fig. 2. History of
system is as follows:
H =
{
∅,{g1, 1S11 , 1S12},{1S11 , {g2, 2S11 , 2S12}},{1S12 , {g3, 3S12 , (3C, 3D)1}},{
2S
1
1 , {g4, (4C, 4C)1,2}
}
,
{
2S
1
2 , {g5, (5C, 5D)1,2, (5C, 5D)
′
1,2}
}
,{
(3C, 3D)1, {g6, (6C, 6D)1,2, (6C, 6D)′1,2}
}
,
{
3S
1
2 , {g7, (7C, 7C)1,2}
}
,{
(4C, 4D)1,2, (5C, 5D)
′
1,2, (6C, 6D)1,2, {g8, (8C, 8C)1,2}
}
,{
(5C, 5D)1,2, (6C, 6D)
′
1,2, (7C, 7D)1,2, {g9, (9C, 9C)1,2}
}
,{
(8C, 8C)1,2, (9C, 9D)1,2, {g10}
}}
.
In Fig. 2, if Chicken had dominant strategy even for one player, atomic war was
probably occurred. This weakness of not having dominant strategy in this game
causes the players to consider their strategic preferences and not to use tactical
preferences inside the game. In other words, players prefer strategic preferences
over tactical preferences. Therefore, it can be concluded that in Cuban missile
crisis, the two countries reached to compromise.
4 Rostam’s Dilemma (Weak Trust Game)
In section Cuban missile crisis, game g9 in Fig. 2, is one of the other several
dilemmas that we confront in attempt to achieve cooperation. In this game,
cooperation can produce the best possible overall result, but there is a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium that wants to draw us toward itself. Difference
between this dilemma and some of other dilemmas is that in the Rostam’s
Dilemma, cooperation is weak dominant over non-cooperation. Despite Prisoner’s
Dilemma that players have no trust in each other, in Rostam’s Dilemma, there is a
weak trust between players but yet this weak trust doesn’t ensure that cooperation
completely. There has been a view that if players trust in each other, they will
obtain better result but this game shows that despite players weak trust in each
other, there is no definite guarantee to achieve desirable result and this trust is
fragile.
Abolghasem Ferdosi Toosi is an Iranian epic poet and composer of Iran national
epic Shahnameh that stated conflict between Rostam and Sohrab in the epic form
[6]. Rostam and Sohrab epic is one of the saddest events of Shahnameh. Rostam is
11
Figure 2. Dynamic system of games between Soviet Union and America
one of the Iranian athletes that marry to Samangan king’s daughter, Tahmineh.
Some days after marriage, he said goodbye to Tahmineh, and happily came to
Iran from there went to Zabolestan. After nine months Tahmineh gave birth to a
boy and informed Rostam. He was named Sohrab. One day Sohrab went to his
mother and said: who is my father? If someone asks me what I say in answer?
Mother said: you are the son of robust athlete Rostam and from Sam and Zal
race.
In fact there are several intertwined pieces in Rostam and Sohrab story but the
main conflict is between Rostam and Sohrab. After some years Soharb with an
army of Tooranian and Samanganian depart for war with Iranians. When Rostam
reached to Sohrab on the battle plain said: let go from here to another side and
fight. Sohrab agreed and demanded person to person war and said: you are old
and not able to fight against me. Rostam said: calm down. Many demons were
killed in my hand so wait to see me in fight. I don’t like to fight with you and kill
you. Sohrab suddenly asked: who are you and from what race? I think you are
Rostam. Rostam said: no Im not. Both went to battle field and fought to the end
12 ()
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NF 4,4 1,3
F 3,1 1,1
G
′
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C 4,4 1,3
B 3,1 1,1
Figure 3. G is a Rostam’s Dilemma. G
′
is a game between wife and husband.
of day. Rostam said it is night, tomorrow we wrestle. Rostam said himself: I have
a son from Tahmineh who is a youth as old as Sohrab and maybe he is himself.
By sunrise, they went again to battle field. Sohrab said with himself: the more
I watch him, the more I think that he is Rostam himself and I have not to fight
with him. Sohrab said to Rostam: how was last night? Come on sit down to speak
with each other and don’t fight. My heart is drawn to you. I asked to know your
name a lot of time but no one told me your name then don’t hide your name.
Rostam said: last night, we talked about wrestling you cant deceive me. Then
they wrestled and fought for a while finally Sohrab took Rostam’s belt and threw
him on the ground and took out dagger but Rostam said: our tradition is that
one who throws a person on the ground doesn’t kill him first time but in the
second time kill him. Sohrab agreed because he was both brave and chivalrous.
They went again to battle field and grappled, this time Rostam threw Sohrab on
the ground then took out his dagger and killed him.
With help of game theory, the game between Rostam and Sohrab is modeled.
Rostam has two actions; either he says his name to Sohrab S or not says his name
to Sohrab NS. Sohrab also has two actions; either he fights against Rostam F
or not to fight against Rostam NF . We call this game as Rostam’s Dilemma. In
Rostam’s Dilemma, Sohrab is considered as row player (player 1) and Rostam is
considered as column (player 2)(Fig. 3G). Because in static game, players choose
their action simultaneously.
The above game is a symmetric game. Row player has weak dominant action
NF . Column player has weak dominant action S. This game has two Nash
equilibria (NF,S) and (F,NS). Rostam’s Dilemma is strategy maker of order
(2, 2). Row player has weak dominant strategy NF and weak dominated strategy
F . Column player has weak dominant strategy S and weak dominated strategy
NS. Also the game has four pairs of rational actions (NF,S)1,2, (F,NS)1,2,
(NF,NS)2 and (F, S)1.
Recently Eshaghi and Askari introduced a new concept of rational choice called
hyper-rational choice. In this concept, the actor thinks about profit or loss of other
actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will choose an action which
is desirable to him [5]. This concept explains that, based on the loss of player 2, F
is a strictly dominant action for player 1, and based on the loss of player 1, NS is a
strictly dominant action for player 2. If interaction between players is based on loss
of other player, player 1 prefers: (F,NS)1 ∼′ (F, S)1 ′ (NF,NS)1 ′ (NF,S)1,
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and player 2 prefers: (F,NS)2 ∼′ (NF,NS)2 ′ (F, S)2 ′ (NF,S)2. Therefore,
for both players two pairs of actions (NF,S), (F,NS) are hyper-rational.
Rostam’s game put a dilemma on the way of players. Yet two players have
weak dominant actions and can choose that and gain more payoff. In the other
words, each players weak dominant action in some kind build a weak trust
between players and this weak trust is fragile. But the game is dilemma because
players can select weak dominated action and obtain least payoff. In game g9
of Fig. 2, both players based on system dynamic and weak trust to each other
selected weak dominant strategy. In other words, based on collective benefit
thinking, both player prefers: (9C, 9C) ′ (9D, 9D) ′ ((9D, 9C) ′ (9C, 9D) or
(9C, 9C) ′ (9D, 9D) ′ ((9C, 9D) ′ (9D, 9C). But in the game between Rostam
and Sohrab because a game occur just once, weak trust was broken and both
selected weak dominated action. In other words, based on collective loss thinking,
both player prefers: (F,NS) ′ (NF,S) ′ (F, S) ′ (NF,NS) or (F,NS) ′
(NF,S) ′ (NF,NS) ′ (F, S). Weak trust between Rostam and Sohrab was
broken and turned into distrust to each other and son (Sohrab) was killed by
father(Rostam).
Now, as an application of the Rostam’s Dilemma, social dilemma in the way of
a wife and husband is modeled. Consider a couple who live together for several
years, The couple are disagreeing with each other about a problem. This dispute
lead to having trouble between husband and wife in some other problems. If
both player condonation C of these disputes and resolve all problems, then each
earns reward 4. If the husband select condonation of disputes, but the wife blame
husband and intensify disputes B, then the wife gain payoff 3 and the husband
gets 1 and vice versa. If the wife to blame her husband and the husband to blame
her wife, more intensify disputes becomes, then both gain a payoff 1. The wife is
considered as row player (player 1) and husband is considered as column (player
2)(Fig. 3G
′
).
This dilemma occurs in most societies, wife and husband have weakly dominant
strategy C, but sometimes wife and husband select weakly dominated strategy
B, which lead to intensify disputes. The game Nash equilibria are (C,C) and
(B,B). Eshaghi and Askari introduced a new concept that Called taxonomy [5].
Taxonomy of hyper-preference means that if we face an actor with two choices of
hyper-preferences, she will necessarily have an opinion on which she likes more.
Taxonomy of players hyper-preferences depends on environmental condition, the
kind of behavior interactive, self-evaluation system and evaluation system of other
interacting persons, helps to the wife and husband that based on collective profit
prefer (C,C) and based on collective loss prefer (B,B).
5 Conclusion
The dynamic system of games helps us to analyze an event by dividing it into
different courses and dynamically using several games. This will enable the event
analyst to evaluate the decisions and strategies that the players have chosen and
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achieved a reasonable and acceptable result. The system also shows the impact
of players’ decisions on each other and the impact of games on each other in any
period.
In this study, we used the dynamic system of strategic games to investigate the
interaction between Soviet Union and America after World War II until October
28, 1926, that is, the end of Cuban missile crisis. To this end, we divide this
time interval into five periods and in each period, we reviewed static games with
complete information that has occurred. Each country, based on its forces and
capabilities, sought to achieve its goals and objectives in Cuba. Therefore, it can be
concluded that in Cuban missile crisis, the two countries reached to compromise.
Dynamics system of games is a combination of dynamic and static interactive
situations that are moving forward. In many cases, dynamic system of strategic
games can provide a mechanism to move towards cooperation between players
which helps to find a solution to exit conflicts. Moreover, we introduced Rostams
Dilemma. Rostams Dilemma is a symmetric 2× 2 game that examines difficult
conditions of decision making between hyper-rational players. In this game, a
weak trust has been created between players, but it is fragile. The new attitude
in this article toward 2× 2 games properties can result in a new and different
characterization compared to the topology of 2× 2 games. The hyper-rational
choice theory suggests that hyper-rational players have considered three classes of
hyper-preferences that help determine how to behave in interactive decisions. The
goal of a game analysis with two hyper-rationality players is to provide insight into
real-world situations that are often more complex than a game with two rational
players where the choices of strategy is only based on individual preferences.
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